



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 11

1961

Commonwealth Economic Conference

by Donald F. Heatherington

What may prove the most significant of post-war Commonwealth conferences was adjourned in London on December 11 after two weeks of wide-ranging discussion and decision by the prime ministers and representative cabinet associates of Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

The conference had been convened only after intensive preparatory work, which indicated that more than casual importance was attached to these deliberations. This preparation may have had an unfortunate, and quite unforeseen, consequence, for it led to expectations which the communiqué released at the close failed to fulfill. Some observers frankly admitted considerable disappointment with the communiqué, criticizing it as extremely general, lacking in detail, and filled with platitudes. Granted that the communiqué contains little that is either new or startling, it does foreshadow a course of action and a common approach.

The conference represented a logical follow-up to the meeting in January 1952, at which the Commonwealth finance ministers agreed on certain over-all objectives of sterling-area

policy. In fact, according to the communiqué, the measures taken in accordance with the conclusions of the January 1952 meeting enabled the December conference to decide that a more positive policy could now be adopted, both by the Commonwealth countries themselves and in concert with others, to promote the expansion of world production and trade. Whereas at the January meeting the overwhelming concern was to find the most expeditious means to prevent further deterioration in the economic situation and halt the drain on reserves, the December conference could give major attention to basic policies and to longer-run objectives in view of the noticeable improvement in the sterling area's gold and dollar reserve and in Britain's terms of trade.

The following principles were accepted as governing the approach of the Commonwealth to a whole array of subjects: (1) Internal economic policies designed to curb inflation and rises in the cost of living should be steadily pursued; (2) sound economic development should be encouraged with the aim of increasing productive strength and competitive power, providing employment

FEBRUARY 15, 1953

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
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and raising standards of living; and (3) a multilateral trade and payments system should be extended over the widest possible area. The Commonwealth countries, it should be noted, emphatically rejected the idea that they are seeking the creation of a discriminatory economic bloc.

More specifically, the communiqué reveals that agreement was reached on the following points: (1) There is a vital need to expand the earning power of all the sterling countries; (2) economic development should be concentrated on projects which directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of the sterling area's balance of payments with the rest of the world by strengthening their economies and increasing their competitive power in world markets; (3) to facilitate development, policies should be adopted which increase the flow of savings; (4) every effort should be exerted to create conditions which encourage investment from outside the sterling area, particularly from the United States; and (5) sterling should resume its full role as a medium of world trade and exchange.

The communiqué reveals something less than full agreement on two proposals, namely, commodity policy and release from the "No new preference" rule in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since many of the sterling Commonwealth countries are heavy producers of raw materials and agricultural commodities, and the area as a whole derives much of its income from their export and sale, it has been increasingly suggested that

action be taken to stabilize prices and demand. For various reasons, including possibly the presence of delegations from consuming as well as from producing countries, the conference, while recognizing that violent fluctuations and an uneconomic level of prices were against the interest of both consumers and producers, agreed that there was no one universal remedy for the problem. Accordingly, the Commonwealth governments contented themselves with expressing a readiness to cooperate in considering, commodity by commodity, international schemes designed to insure stability of demand and prices at an economic level.

Preferences and Convertibility

Discussion of a proposal for a joint approach to the GATT seeking release from the "No new preference" rule was initiated by Britain. Despite some support, sufficient opposition was registered to prevent adoption of the proposal. A compromise solution was reached whereby all Commonwealth governments agreed to cooperate with Britain in its efforts to meet particular tariff difficulties so that it might continue duty-free entry for Commonwealth goods in the event of changes in the British tariff, and to consider sympathetically certain special tariff problems affecting the colonies.

Undoubtedly more time was spent in discussion of the vital issue of sterling convertibility than the brief section in the communiqué would suggest. While the restoration of such convertibility is regarded as forming an integral part of any ef-

fective multilateral system, it is recognized that it can only be reached by progressive stages. Three basic conditions are set for achievement of convertibility: (1) the continuing success of the action by the sterling countries themselves; (2) the prospect that trading nations will adopt policies conducive to the expansion of world trade; and (3) the availability of adequate financial support through the International Monetary Fund or otherwise.

A more detailed program was doubtless worked out by the delegations, but there are several reasons why these details could not now be disclosed. The words "cooperation" and "international action" or their variants recur throughout the communiqué. Thus, it is stated that the conference agreed to seek the cooperation of other countries in a plan to create the conditions for expanding world production and trade, to secure international agreement on the adoption of policies by creditor and debtor countries designed to restore balance in the world economy, to seek acceptance of the program or plan by the governments of the United States and of European countries, and to work as far as possible through existing international institutions. Much, therefore, depends on the course of these projected discussions, which undoubtedly will include some effort to harmonize United States and British economic policies.

(Mr. Heatherington, director of the European Division of the National Foreign Trade Council, previously was adviser on Commonwealth financial affairs in the Department of Commerce.)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: J. BARTLET BREBNER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES. JOHN W. NASON, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; BLAIR BOLLES, *Washington Correspondent*; FELICE NOVICH, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Re-entered as second-class matter September 26, 1951 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.



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Letter from Paris

PARIS — In a report to the United States House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on January 4, Representatives Mike Mansfield (now Senator) of Montana and Henderson Lanham of Georgia noted that France made "tremendous strides" in 1952 to stabilize its economy. The question now frequently heard in Paris is whether the concessions granted by René Mayer, France's new prime minister who came to power on January 8, to obtain his office will disturb this hard-won stability and thus usher in a new period of political uncertainty.

The present stability, attained under the cabinet of Mayer's predecessor, Antoine Pinay, has a precarious foundation. France has yet to find the internal political policies which would enable it to make the most of its economic strength. Pinay carried out no fundamental reforms. The most he accomplished was to bring the various economic forces into a state of frozen balance.

This was a considerable achievement. Mayer is said to have told Pinay that he wished to carry forward the latter's policies, which at home had checked the rise of prices and, abroad, despite uneasy French skepticism about various points, had stressed adherence to the concept of cooperation with the United States and other North Atlantic powers in the build-up of Western strength and the development of the Atlantic community. But social forces which Mayer will find it hard to ignore are making demands inimical to the kind of stability France enjoys today.

Already, to obtain the support of the political parties whose help he needs to carry on policies inherited

from the conservative Pinay, the conservative Mayer, a member of the Radical party, finds himself under pressure to add 200 billion francs (\$500 million) to the French budget for aid to veterans and for increased family allocations in the social security program. Pinay during his nine months in office was unable to persuade parliament to increase taxes. Today an increase in the budget without new taxes would unleash the forces of inflation which Pinay curbed but could not erase. A rise in the present cost of living index from its present 146 to 149 would automatically invoke the *échelle mobile* ("sliding scale") law of last June, which provides for a 10 percent wage raise at 149. Manufacturers can be expected to counter wage increases with price increases.

Constitutional Revision

The counterpressures on Mayer to be thrifty pose problems for French security. The new prime minister discussed with René Pleven, defense minister, the possibility of cutting 80 billion to 100 billion (\$229.6 million to \$287 million) from the budget for military and civil expenses. The National Assembly on January 29 voted the 1953 budget of 3,831,000,000,000 francs (\$10,994,970,000), 37 percent of which will be spent on defense. But 80 billion francs (\$229.6 million) of this total will be "frozen" to balance the budget against expected revenue of 3,751,000,000,000 francs (\$10,765,370,000).

The basic problem of Mayer, then, is to manage his multiparty cabinet (its 23 members represent at least 9 parties and factions) in a way which at least safeguards the present deli-

cate economic balance. The interests of the parties composing his cabinet are in conflict, and the beginnings of a new inflation resulting from party conflicts would intensify the differences between Right and Left in parliament. Under the 1946 constitution parliament remains the center of authority and political decision. Dissatisfaction with the constitution in several quarters has provoked demands for its revision in a way that would center power in the executive on the assumption that the shift would bring economic and political stability.

The revisionists are vague, however, on the question of how stability could be based on the present multiparty system even if the president of the council—that is, the prime minister—and his ministers or some other executive group were elevated to pre-eminence. The problem of parties goes deeper. What is striking today is not only the number of parties but the inertia of the major parties in leadership and opposition. The entrepreneurs are troubled by the disinclination of many men of position and ability to enter politics; this results in petty caution on the Right. The wage-earners resent the failure of the Left parties, particularly the Socialists, to exercise a consistently vigorous opposition. Current interest in constitutional revision reflects French concern for political stability, which, in view of the successive failures of the two preceding governments—Edgar Faure and Antoine Pinay—on economic issues, appears to be a prerequisite to economic stability.

BLAIR BOLLES



What Should the New Administration Do About World Trade?

by Gordon H. Michler

Mr. Michler, adviser on foreign government relations at the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, is also chairman of the General Committee at the National Foreign Trade Council. In this latter capacity he was United States delegate to the London German Debt Conference in 1952.

THE primary and general suggestion, applicable to trade with all foreign areas, that might be usefully offered to the new Administration is to minimize interference with, and undue restrictions upon, the normal course of international business. In this way the United States government, representing the world's leading trading nation, would set a constructive example for other governments to follow. Reducing this general observation to more specific suggestions requires a brief evaluation of existing conditions in two of the great trading areas of the free world, Europe and Latin America.

Trend Toward Nationalism

In Western Europe, where ultranationalism, economic as well as political, was responsible for two of the most destructive wars in history, we find at last a real effort being made toward integration of this community of 225 million hard-working, highly intelligent people, whose welfare is inextricably associated with our own. Europe, largely due to its own efforts, has recovered to a point where industrial production has increased in four years by 56 percent, an investment program hitherto unknown has been carried out, and per capita consumption has regained its prewar level. Under these circumstances the time has come for "Trade, not aid"—the slogan launched in 1952 by Richard H. Butler, British Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is the moment for private enterprise and private investments to come to the front and for United States government aid, which has played a vital

part in accomplishing Europe's recovery, to retire gracefully to the background—to the relief of American taxpayers.

In Latin America ultranationalism, which has run its destructive course in Europe, is unfortunately on the increase, accompanied by government controls and interference. This is happening for reasons other than war dislocation and damage, as in Europe. Rather, we see the spirit of nationalism sweeping the underdeveloped countries of the world, a groping for independence economically as well as politically, and an emotional revolt against so-called "economic imperialism" which expresses itself in hasty and unbalanced efforts to industrialize countries that are by nature raw-products suppliers, unequipped as yet financially and technically for rapid industrialization. Not only state-controls but state monopolies opposed to private enterprise development and to the countries' own best national interests are active symbols of this movement. In Latin America, as in Europe and other areas of the world, communism plays upon nationalism to cause disorder.

Proposed Remedies

Under these circumstances what should the new Administration do to foster healthy world trade as an essential basis for friendly international relations?

In Europe, with its need to recover from postwar economic dislocation, our government should help, in every appropriate way it can, the Western European nations' own efforts to-

ward integration. Beyond this it would seem that the Administration should recognize that the era of government financing, for economic development at least, is past, and should direct its attention to encouraging and supporting private American enterprise investments and trade with Europe.

In Latin America, with its trend toward nationalism, particularly exemplified by industrialization, the Administration should use its efforts and influence to obtain, through bilateral treaties or otherwise, a suitable climate for private investment and equal treatment for the American with the national investor. United States government financing of Latin American government projects, monopolistic or competitive with private enterprise, should cease, and the road should be left clear to private investment and operation of such projects by United States and/or domestic capital in the best long-term interest of the countries concerned.

On financial policies that are the root of so much evil at home and abroad, let us hope that our own and foreign governments—having experienced the dire results of deficit financing accompanied by inflation, high taxes and resulting undue government controls—may now turn about and adopt sound financial policies and fiscal management that are the *sine qua non* for confidence and sound commercial development. The United States, as the strongest financial power in the world, should set the example in this respect.

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by Arthur V. Watkins

Senator Watkins, Republican of Utah, is a member of the Joint Committee of the Economic Report, of the Senate Judiciary Committee and of the Senate Interior Insular Affairs Committee. He was re-elected for his second term in the Senate in 1952.

ANY legislative action which the new Administration may take in regard to world trade must of necessity be influenced by, and enmeshed with, its action and policy in regard to foreign aid and the tariff laws of the United States.

It is abundantly clear that the scoop-shovel foreign aid programs of recent years with resultant budget deficits and high taxes are approaching an end. The new Administration is under direct orders from the American electorate to make sharp reductions in foreign-aid spending. Failure substantially to reduce the retiring Administration's request for \$7.6 billion in new foreign-aid appropriations for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1953 would be a repudiation of specific Republican campaign pledges. It is not likely, however, that the new Administration will completely abandon foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Foreign aid will be subjected to a thorough "look-see," and out of that survey will come a revised program, greatly reduced in amount and very carefully pinpointed to specific areas and objectives.

Would More Trade Help?

Some months ago, speaking through Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard H. Butler, British business and political leaders launched a program to substitute increased trade for the handout type of economic assistance. The trite slogan, "Trade, not aid," has come into wide use as a means of conveying the thought that Europe can get the dollars it needs through enlarged access to the

domestic American market rather than by cash handouts from the United States Treasury.

In Europe and elsewhere the sponsors of "Trade, not aid" seem intent on creating the impression that increased trade will automatically eliminate the need for further foreign aid. Certain American business circles are especially entranced by the "Trade, not aid" idea because they have long been aware of the fact that subsidizing exports by means of dollar grants is unsound and mutually disadvantageous to both the United States and the recipients of American aid. The retiring Secretary of Commerce, Charles W. Sawyer, pointed out this fact when he reported to the President of the United States in December 1952, "Indefinite dependence on aid destroys self-respect, impairs the real strength of the recipient economy and has a capacity to destroy friendly relations between the giver and the recipient."

The fact seems to be that if the countries of Western Europe continue on their present basis, even the adoption of a free-trade policy by the United States would not completely eliminate the dollar gap. There is growing evidence that hope for a permanent solution to Europe's problem lies in economic reforms in Europe which will make for a more equitable sharing of the benefits of modern industrial methods by the various segments of the European population. Western Europe can and, in fact, must attempt to provide within itself a substantial market for the products of its own farms and factories.

American aid has made it possible for Europe to make a start in modernizing its industrial plant and in improving its agricultural methods. From here on Europe must endeavor to make more effective use of its manpower. Europe must also find a way to enable that manpower to consume a greater proportion of the goods which it produces.

The Mutual Security Agency in one of its more fanciful moments has estimated that revision of United States tariff laws might enable Europe to increase its sales to the United States to a figure approaching \$1.5 billion a year.

Obviously, there is no comfort for either the manufacturer or the farmer in the suggestion that he further jeopardize his investment and his means of earning a living by inviting foreign producers to take over the markets which have been created by the economic system in which he lives. Neither industry nor agriculture object to fair competition, even if that competition comes from abroad. They do object, however, to any tariff action which gives a competitive advantage to foreign producers. There simply is no way to convince the average American of the rectitude of any course of action by their government which will have the effect of forcing American producers—who are also citizens and taxpayers—out of business in order that increased prosperity may be brought to foreign producers who are not taxpayers and who owe no obligations of citizenship to the United States government.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act will come up for renewal in the 83rd Congress in June. This will necessitate a careful study of tariff and trade policies of the present and immediate past. Various proposals have already been made to give effect

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Michler

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One tangible item on which our government could encourage United States private enterprise investments abroad is elimination or substantial abatement of double taxation — the process through which our government collects the balance of corporate taxes on profits earned abroad after allowance for such taxes paid to the country where the operation takes place. By sacrificing about \$400 million of such revenue annually, our government could make a real contribution to stimulating United States foreign investment; and it could do so at a cost lower than the amount it is today spending through government financing agencies in one area — Latin America — on projects which do not touch the core of the problem.

Abandonment by our government of an attitude indicating hostility toward, or actual competition with, private enterprise would be wholesome. One example of hostile action was recently given by the widely broadcast accusations of the Department of Justice against the major oil companies in foreign trade on the grounds of monopolistic or cartel actions to restrict world oil production and trade. The effect of these sweeping accusations before establishment of legal proof was to undermine confidence abroad in the integrity of American business general-

ly and so to do far-reaching damage not only to American foreign trade but also to the economies of the countries which benefit from these investments.

Another subject to which the new Administration can usefully direct its efforts is our tariff policy. Some progress toward liberalization and modernization of this and other trade barriers has been made by our government in concert with others in recent years. More is needed. The greatest problem of all in our trade with foreign countries is the "dollar gap." How can we expect this gap to close or expect Western Europe to get off the dole and on to a "Trade, not aid" basis unless we make it possible for the European nations to sell us their goods? It is self-evident that to be a seller you must also be a buyer. If we really mean what we say about the virtues of free competition and are as good competitively as we like to think we are, should we fear the consequences of really free trade?

Along the lines of these suggestions, as well as others, there is a real field for constructive accomplishment by the new Administration in encouraging world trade.

Watkins

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to the contention that increased European sales in the United States

must be allowed as a means of bringing an end to postwar foreign-aid spending. There is no doubt that pressures for the reduction of tariffs will mount as the time for congressional action on reciprocal trade legislation approaches. The 83rd Congress will not be in any great haste to enact a tariff program which threatens to destroy any essential segment of American industry or agriculture.

It can be assumed with equal finality that such action as the 83rd Congress may take toward translating the "Trade, not aid" idea into reality will be predicated on an acceptance of the fact that the United States is not self-sufficient. President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself acknowledged this circumstance when he stated in his Inaugural Address that the United States needs foreign markets for the surplus of its farms and factories and that "equally, we need for these same farms and factories vital materials and products of distant lands." Thus it may well be that what the new Administration will do in regard to world trade will be determined largely by the feeling that Western Europe can do much to help itself if it will make a serious effort to develop within its own area larger markets for the products of its farms and factories.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



The Prague Trials: Before and After — 3

In the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN of February 1 a brief survey was given of the exile groups of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. Of all the Eastern European exile groups, that from Poland is the largest numerically, since many of

the Poles, who had already been living in exile during the war, did not return to Poland after 1945 and remained in Britain (about 160,000), the United States (100,000) and France (400,000).

The Polish emigration is divided

into three principal organizations: (1) The shadow-government-in-exile, organized in London in 1949 as successor to the wartime exile government, with August Zaleski, foreign minister in 1926-31, as president. The prime minister of this shadow-

government is now former General of Artillery Odziejewski, who enjoys the support of General Anders, former commander of the Polish Second Corps in Italy. (2) The Polish Political Council, which has its headquarters in London and working committees in New York and Paris. This Council is composed of members of two important Polish prewar parties, the Polish National Democratic party and the Polish Socialist party, and several minor groups. Among the members of the Council is R. Pilsudski, a nephew of the late Marshal Pilsudski who professes democratic political views. The main difference between the Polish Political Council and the shadow-government is that the former supports the 1935 constitution solely because it gives continuity to the Polish state but wants to apply it in a democratic way, while the latter considers the 1935 constitution as the basis for continuing an authoritarian government. Zaleski is *persona non grata* to Polish democratic forces. (3) The Polish National Democratic Committee in Washington headed by Stanislaus Mikolajczyk, who had returned to Poland in 1945 and fled to the West in 1947. This committee is composed of members of Mikolajczyk's Peasant party, a group of the Labor party and the Democratic party. Mikolajczyk, who served as vice-premier in a Communist-dominated cabinet, agrees with the Polish Political Council on the need to have a democratic constitution after liberation, but sees no need for recognizing the 1935 constitution purely to maintain the continuity of the Polish state.

The Poles and Oder-Neisse

Despite their political differences, all three Polish organizations agree that the Oder-Neisse line, established in 1945 through Germany's surren-

der of territory to Poland, would be the best frontier in the West and that the claims to the territories lost to the Soviet Union should be maintained and defended. The Polish Political Council, with its right-wing National Democrats and left-wing Socialists, and the Mikolajczyk Committee with the main body of the Polish Peasant party, base their programs on the declarations formulated by the Council of National Unity in Underground Poland during World War II. These declarations provide for assuring democratic liberties, a sound agricultural structure based on individual peasant holdings, full participation of all citizens in the government system, widespread local political institutions, industrial development and full respect for the rights of national minorities if any are found in the future Polish state. Both these groups emphatically condemn the prewar dictatorship of the Pilsudski regime. The shadow-government in London has never pronounced itself against these declarations, but its adherence to the spirit as well as the letter of the 1935 constitution is thought to indicate that it would favor an authoritarian system of government. However, it is not believed that this group would urge the restoration of prewar social and economic inequalities.

All three organizations look with favor on projects for a federated Europe, but feel some apprehension about the role of Germany in such a federation. All Polish exiles are indifferent to the concept of a Danubian federation, in which Poland could not be a member. The Polish Political Council and the Mikolajczyk group would be ready to consider a smaller federation in East-Central Europe including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, linked to a European federation.

The shadow-government in London favors a huge federation stretching from Finland to Greece and including the Ukraine, and wants not only to push Russia back into its 1939 frontiers but to smash the Russian empire altogether.

Subverting Communism?

The Communist attacks on, and purges of, alleged pro-Zionists, which, starting with Prague, were extended to Sofia and Budapest and on January 13 also to the U.S.S.R., have raised anew the question whether the United States, by adopting internal subversion methods like those followed by the Kremlin, might be able to bring about the downfall of communism without the need of resorting to armed force.

To this question two contradictory answers have been given in the United States. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had indicated in the past that the United States should treat the Kremlin the way the Communists are treating the United States and keep the Soviet leaders busy at home by "giving them some homework." In his first statement on foreign policy Mr. Dulles, using a phrase which some commentators described as dangerously sweeping and imprecise, said, "To all those suffering under Communist slavery, to the timid and the intimidated peoples of the world, let us say this: 'You can count on us'." By contrast George F. Kennan, former American Ambassador to Moscow and one of this country's leading experts on Russia, speaking before the Pennsylvania State Bar Association at Scranton on January 16, expressed the view that "liberation" of Russia's satellites by subversion and sabotage "to the extent it might be successful . . . would involve us in heavy responsibilities." The prospects for success, he said,

"would be very small indeed, since the problem of civil disobedience is not a great problem to the modern police dictatorship."

Assuming, however, that subversion and sabotage are tried, and the governments of the Eastern Europe satellites, if not the government of the U.S.S.R., topple without war, what regimes could or should succeed them, and what would be the international position of the liberated countries?

To these questions, too, several answers are offered. Some of the exile groups hope that democratic institutions modeled on those of Britain and the United States could be erected with relative promptness on the ruins of communism. Others favor the re-establishment of authoritarian governments which had existed during the interwar period. Some exiles who throughout their careers have been most devoted to democratic ideas and practices now believe that the United States tends to favor Rightist elements who once sought to exploit nazism and fascism, and does so on the assumption that the Rightists are ardent anti-Communists who would work for the re-establishment of free enterprise where it existed. Such an attitude on the part of the United States, in the opinion of prodemocratic exiles, might mean that after liberation au-

thoritarian leaders would be the first beneficiaries of a Communist downfall and that hopes of democracy in Eastern Europe would once more go aglimmering.

UN Supervision?

The most thoughtful among the exiles warn that the United States should not expect to see overnight the establishment of democracy on the Anglo-American pattern or the renewal of free enterprise where it once existed. A few are advancing the suggestion that an interim period of adjustment will prove necessary if a new form of authoritarianism is to be avoided. One proposal is that if and when the satellite countries are liberated from Moscow's domination, they should for a period of time be placed under the tutelage of a United Nations Commission. This, it is argued, would not only permit the restoration of order, justice and economic stability but would also prevent possible resort to Rightist totalitarianism as an antidote to communism.

The placing of liberated countries under United Nations tutelage would also, it is believed, answer another serious question. This question is whether the Eastern European countries, which, as the interwar years amply demonstrated, were politically and economically weak as compared

with their two powerful neighbors, Germany and Russia, might not be jumping out of the frying pan into the fire if, once freed of Russian domination, they were to be confronted with a remilitarized and possibly militant Germany. Between 1919 and 1939 Eastern Europe and the Balkans sought to solve this dilemma by the formation of Balkan and Danubian federations. None of these schemes succeeded, and in World War II the nations of this area were overrun either by the Germans or the Russians or both.

Some of the exile leaders now favor the attachment of their countries to an all-European union. Such a union, however, would hardly be in a position to resist either Germany or Russia and certainly not a combination of the two, such as some observers anticipate might be the result of current Communist and Nazi activities. It is because of this possible danger to the future independence of small weak countries which throughout history have been pawns and victims of the great empires of Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary that the thoughts of some students of Eastern Europe are turning to the possibility of international rather than European safeguards against aggression from either side.

— VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The third of three articles)

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